This paper presents concentration inequalities and laws of large numbers under weak assumptions of irrelevance, expressed through lower and upper expectations. The results extend de Cooman and Miranda's recent results concerning epistemic irrelevance. The proofs indicate connections between concepts of irrelevance for lower/upper expectations and the standard theory of martingales.
Introduction
This paper investigates concentration inequalities and laws of large numbers under weak assumptions of "irrelevance" that are expressed using lower and upper expectations. The starting point is de Cooman and Miranda's concept of forward irrelevance [5] . Given a set of bounded variables X 1 , . . . , X n , forward irrelevance means that for each i ∈ [2, n], variables X 1:i−1 are epistemically irrelevant to X i .
Here and in the remainder of the paper we simplify notation by using X 1:i−1 for X 1 , . . . , X i . As the definition in the previous paragraph indicates, forward irrelevance is based on the concept of epistemic irrelevance. As defined by Walley [24, Def. 9.2.1], epistemic irrelevance of variables X 1:i−1 to X i obtains when
for any bounded function f of X i and any event A(X 1:i−1 ) defined by variables X 1:i−1 . Here the functional E is an upper expectation (Section 2). A judgement of epistemic irrelevance can be interpreted as a relaxed judgement of stochastic independence, perhaps motivated by a robustness analysis or by disagreements amongst a set of decision makers. Alternatively, one might consider epistemic irrelevance as the appropriate concept of independence when expectations are not known precisely; the latter perspective is adopted by Walley and by de Cooman and Miranda.
When forward irrelevance holds, de Cooman and Miranda's weak law of large numbers says that for any ǫ > 0,
where
Moreover, de Cooman and Miranda prove a two-part strong law of large numbers that reads: for any ǫ > 0, there is N ∈ N + such that for any N ′ ∈ N + ,
This law of large numbers corresponds to a finitary version of the usual strong law of large numbers [9] ; the focus on a finitary law is justified by the fact that de Cooman and Miranda do not assume countable additivity. If countable additivity holds, the finitary strong law of large numbers implies convergence of empirical means with probability one [5, Sec. 5.3] . To obtain their results, de Cooman and Miranda assume, following Walley's theory of lower previsions: that all variables are bounded; that conditioning is defined for every nonempty conditioning event; that conglomerability (and consequently disintegrability) holds. These assumptions are discussed in more detail later. The present paper derives laws of large numbers by exploiting concentration and martingale inequalities that are adapted to the setting of lower/upper expectations. The paper proves laws of large numbers under even weaker assumptions than forward irrelevance; namely, we assume only that for each i ∈ [2, n], for any event A(X 1:i−1 ),
Moreover, in Section 4 we lift the assumption of boundedness for variables.
Expectations, disintegrability, and zero probabilities
Throughout the paper we assume that an expectation functional E maps bounded variables into real numbers, and satisfies:
where X, Y are bounded variables and α, β are real numbers (inequalities are understood pointwise).
From such an expectation functional, a finitely additive probability measure P is induced by P (A) . = E[A] for any event A. Note that A denotes both the event and its indicator function. A probability measure defined on a field completely characterizes an expectation functional on bounded functions that are measurable with respect to the field and vice-versa [24, Theorem 3.2.2] .
Given a set of expectation functionals, the lower and expectations of variable X are respectively
Lower and upper probabilities are defined similarly using indicator functions. Given an event A, a conditional expectation functional is constrained by
. If we have a set of expectation functionals, then a set of conditional expectation functionals given an event A is produced by elementwise conditioning on event A (that is, each expectation functional is conditioned on A).
Disintegrability and factorization
We will employ an assumption of disintegrability in our proofs; namely,
where W and Z may stand for sets of variables. Note that disintegrability can fail for a single finitely additive probability measure over an infinite space [6, 10] ; that is, one may have a probability measure P such that
One way to obtain disintegrability is to restrict attention to simple functions; that is, functions that take on finitely many distinct values. (Note that indicator functions are simple functions; hence simple functions suffice to express convergence of relative frequencies.)
Another way to obtain disintegrability for every probability measure P is to adopt countable additivity [1] . That is, assume that if
is a countable sequence of events, then
This assumption says that if ∩ i A i = ∅, then lim n→∞ P (A n ) = 0 for every possible probability measure.
A third way to obtain disintegrability for a single probability measure P is simply to consider it a "rationality" requirement. The theories of coherent behavior by Heath and Sudderty [14] and by Lane and Sudderth [19] follow this path by axiomatizing the strategic measures of Dubins and Savage [11] , and thus prescribing probability measures that disintegrate appropriately along some predefined partitions (this would be sufficient for our purposes, but there are limitations in the approach as summarized by Kadane et al [16] ); the disintegrability of strategic measures has actually been used to prove various laws of large numbers in a finitely additive setting [17] . Another scheme that imposes disintegrability is Walley's theory of lower previsions; in that theory, Expression (2) is a consequence of axioms for "coherent" behavior. This is the path adopted by de Cooman and Miranda, who consequently have Expression (2) at their disposal.
When disintegrability holds, recursive application of Expression (2) yields:
and then using forward irrelevance we obtain, for bounded and nonnegative functions,
Zero probabilities: full conditional measures and regular conditioning
It should be noted that the definition of epistemic irrelevance (Expression (1)) does not contain any clause concerning zero probabilities. This is possible as long as conditioning is defined for any nonempty conditioning event. Indeed, Walley's theory of lower previsions follows de Finetti in adopting full conditional measures, and in this setting Expression (1) can be imposed without further concerns. Recall that a full conditional measure P : B × (B\∅) → ℜ, where B is a Boolean algebra [10, 18] , is a set-function such that for every event C = ∅, satisfies the axioms:
Full conditional measures are not adopted in the usual Kolmogorovian set-up, and if countable additivity is adopted and conditioning is defined through RadonNykodym derivatives, it may be impossible to satisfy the axioms for full conditional measures [22, 23] . Suppose then that one chooses to drop full conditional measures and instead follow the usual Kolmogorovian set-up (including countable additivity and thus disintegrability). It might seem reasonable to amend Expression (1) as follows:
This condition is a natural for theories that do not define conditioning on events of lower probability zero, such as Giron and Rios' theory [13] . Alas, this weaker condition is really too weak to produce laws of large numbers, as the following example shows.
. . assume values in {0, 1, 2}, and
. Suppose additionally that
for x ∈ {0, 1, 2}; that is, the ith variable reproduces the value of the (i − 1)th variable. They are obviously dependent variables. However, all events have lower probability zero, so variables X 1:i−1 would be irrelevant to X i by Expression (5) .
In this example, Expression (4) fails. For instance,
Moreover the example illustrates a failure of any sensible law of large numbers, as for any ǫ > 0,
because the inequality inside the probability is only satisfied when {X 1 = 1} obtains.
We might thus consider an alternative to Expression (5):
This expression calls for an appropriate definition of conditional lower/upper expectations that we call regular conditioning, as it is similar to Walley's concept of regular extension [24, Ap. J]:
This form of conditioning has been advocated by several authors [25, 26] .
The relevant point is that the concept of irrelevance conveyed by Expression (6), when coupled with regular conditioning, does produce Expression (4). To see this, note that for nonnegative X and Y , we have
using disintegrability and defining A as the set of all values of Y such that P (A c ) = 0. Hence P (A c ) = 0 for every P and using Expression (6):
In short, there are several possible ways to define conditioning and irrelevance, and often more than one combination of concepts leads to the results presented in the remainder of this paper. For instance, Expression (4) obtains when forward irrelevance holds [ with epistemic irrelevance either defined by Expression (1) and full conditional measures, or defined by Expression (6) with regular conditioning ], and or all variables are simple, or countable additivity is assumed, or disintegrability (Expression (2)) is demanded on rationality grounds.
Bounded variables
Take variables X 1 , . . . , X n such that |X i | ≤ B i and define
We start by deriving two concentration inequalities.
Concentration inequalities
The following inequality is a counterpart of Hoeffding inequality [8, 15] in the context of lower/upper expectations. It is interesting to note that the proof is remarkably similar to the proof of the original Hoeffding inequality.
Theorem 1 If bounded variables
Proof. By Markov inequality, if X ≥ 0, then for any ǫ > 0 we have
Using this inequality and Expression (4):
We now use Hoeffding's result (Expression (9)) that if variable X satisfies a ≤ X ≤ b and
where the last inequality is obtained by taking s = 4ǫ/γ n . This proves the first inequality in the theorem; the second inequality is proved by tak-
We now relax forward irrelevance considerably, by employing only the following assumption that we call weak irrelevance:
• If full conditional measures are adopted,
• else, if regular conditioning is adopted,
Weak irrelevance allows us to obtain an analogue of Azuma's inequality (usually derived for martingales [3, 7] ). It is again interesting to note that the proof is remarkably similar to the proof of the original Azuma inequality.
Theorem 2
If bounded variables X 1 , . . . , X n satisfy weak irrelevance and disintegrability (Expression (2)) holds, then if γ n > 0,
Proof. Using both Markov's inequality (as in the proof of Theorem 1) and disintegrability, we get for any s > 0,
Due to weak irrelevance,
consequently, for any P ,
for any s > 0. Thus for any P we have
and then h(
These inequalities can be iterated to produce:
Finally, by taking s = 4ǫ/γ n ,
2 /γn .
The second inequality in the theorem is proved by noting that weak irrelevance of X 1 , . . . , X n implies weak irrel-
, and then by taking P
Laws of large numbers
Theorem 1 leads to simple proofs of the results presented by de Cooman and Miranda [5] . We start this section by showing some details in this argument, before we present new laws of large numbers in Theorem 3. Using subadditivity of upper probability and Theorem 1,
where as before, µ n .
We obtain essentially de Cooman and Miranda's weak law of large numbers by noting that P (A) = 1 − P (A c ) for any event A, by including the endpoints of relevant inequalities, and by using nǫ instead of ǫ:
where we define B . = max i B i . By taking limits,
The finitary strong law of large numbers by de Cooman and Miranda can be deduced as well from the previous inequalities. Here and in the remainder of the paper, n, N and N ′ denote positive integers. Note: for all ǫ > 0, N > 0 and N ′ > 0,
Consequently,
provided that N is a positive integer such that
).
An analogous argument leads to
By superadditivity of upper probability, we obtain a perhaps more intuitive statement of the strong law of large numbers: for all ǫ > 0, there is N such that for any N ′ ,
We now present a more general pair of weak/strong laws of large numbers, by replacing forward irrelevance by the weak irrelevance assumption. The proof of the next theorem follows the ideas already rehearsed in this section.
Theorem 3
If bounded variables X 1 , . . . , X n satisfy weak irrelevance and Expression (2) holds, then for any ǫ > 0,
and there is N such that for any N ′ ,
Proof. Using subadditivity of upper probability and Theorem 2, and defining again B .
and we obtain the first expression in the theorem. To produce the second inequality (strong law), note:
This is "half" of the second expression in the theorem; the other "half" is proved analogously. 2 The theorem easily implies the following concise weak law of large numbers, by taking limits:
Laws of large numbers without boundedness
We now consider variables without limits in their ranges, under the assumption of weak irrelevance. We will assume in this section that countable additivity holds (Expression (3)). This assumption of countable addivity implies disintegrability; that is,
for any P , W and Z. Thus our setup is close to the standard (Kolmogorovian) one, where any expectation functional is a linear monotone and monotonically convergent functional that can be expressed through Lebesgue integration. We only depart from tradition in explicitly letting a set of such functionals to be permissible given a set of assessments. We will use a sequence of variables {Y n } defined as follows:
The key observation is that Y n is a function of all variables X 1:n such that
that is, {Y n } is a martingale with respect to P . Consequently,
And by taking expectations on both sides and noting that
Iterating this expression, we obtain:
With these preliminaries, we have: 
and the variance of any X i is no larger than a finite quantity σ 2 , then for any ǫ > 0,
and there is N > 0 such that for any N ′ > 0,
Proof. For a fixed P and for all ǫ > 0,
(using weak irrelevance)
Applying Chebyshev's inequality and Expression (7),
and then:
and combining these inequalities, we obtain:
and then
for any P , as desired. By taking the limit as n grows without bound, we obtain
The proof of the strong law of large numbers uses the same strategy, but replaces the appeal to Chebyshev's inequality by an appeal to the Kolmogorov-Hajek-Renyi inequality (described in the Appendix), following the proof of the strong law of large numbers by Whittle [27, Thm. 14.2.3].
1 So, for a fixed P and for all ǫ > 0, we proceed as previously to obtain:
As {Y N , Y N +1 , . . . , Y N +N ′ } forms a martingale, we use the Kolmogorov-Hajek-Renyi inequality to produce:
(using Expression (8))
Consequently, for integer N > (σ 2 + δ 2 )/(2ǫ 3 ), we obtain the desired inequality
As we assume countable additivity for every P , the proof of the Kolmogorov-Hajek-Renyi can be extended to an infinite intersection of (decreasing) events expressed as {∀j ≥ 1 : |X j | < ǫ j }; thus ∀ǫ > 0 : ∀δ > 0 : ∃N > 0 :
and this is equivalent to:
As the events in these probability values form an increasing sequence, we have, for all ǫ > 0,
Now this is equivalent to ∀k > 0 : P (A k ) = 1, where
This is exactly the desired expression
A similar argument proves the last inequality in the theorem, starting from:
Discussion
The concentration inequalities and laws of large numbers proved in this paper assume rather weak conditions of "irrelevance." When compared to the usual laws of large numbers, both the premises and the consequences are weaker: expectations are not assumed precisely known, and convergence is interval-valued. Theorem 1 and its ensuing laws of large numbers offer essentially the same results as de Cooman and Miranda's seminal work [5] (their results generalize several previous efforts [12] ). The possible advantage of Theorem 1 and its consequences is that their derivation is rather close to the well-known Hoeffding inequality; it should be noted that de Cooman and Miranda already indicate the possible connection between their inequalities and Hoeffding's.
The more significant results of the paper employ "weak irrelevance" to produce concentration inequalities (Theorem 2) and laws of large numbers (Theorems 3 and 4) . The strategy for their proofs is to translate assumptions of weak irrelevance into facts regarding martingales, and to adapt results for martingales to this setting. This strategy keeps the proof relatively short and close to well-known results in probability theory. The connection between epistemic irrelevance and the theory of martingales seems rather natural, but it does not appear to have been explored so far. As another word on martingales, we note the basic constraint defining martingales (that is, that E[Y n |X 1:n−1 ] = Y n−1 ) is preserved by convex combination of mixtures; therefore, the study of martingales seems appropriate when one deals with convex sets of probability measures -certainly it seems less contorted than the analysis through stochastic independence, as stochastic independence is not preserved by convex combination.
The proofs presented in this paper need assumptions of disintegrability that can be easily satisfied if countable additivity is adopted. It is an open question whether similar results can be proven without disintegrability, particularly when one deals with unbounded variables.
A Two auxiliary inequalities
The following inequality is a simple extension of a basic result by Hoeffding [8, 15] for φ(u) = −pu + log(1 − p + pe u ) with p = −a/(b − a) (and note that p ∈ (0, 1] in the situation under consideration). Given that φ(0) = φ ′ (0) = 0 and φ ′′ (u) ≤ 1/4 for u > 0 (as the maximum of φ ′′ (u) is 1/4, attained at e u = (1 − p)/p), we can use Taylor's theorem as follows. For some v ∈ (0, u), φ(u) = φ(0) + uφ ′ (0) + (u 2 /2)φ ′′ (v) ≤ (u 2 /8) and consequently φ(s(b − a)) ≤ s 2 (b − a) 2 /8. By putting together these inequalities, we obtain Expression (9) .
We now review the Kolmogorov-Hajek-Renyi inequality, almost exactly as proved by Whittle [27] ; this is presented just to indicate the role of (elementwise) disintegrability in the derivation. Let {X i } be a martingale with X 0 = 0, and let {ǫ i } be a sequence 0 = ǫ 0 ≤ ǫ 1 ≤ . . . ; the inequality is
To prove this inequality, define
A n . = {∀j ∈ [1, n] : |X j | < ǫ j }.
Then, using ξ i = X i − X i−1 , and again denoting an event and its indicator function by the same symbol, we have (using ǫ n−1 ≤ ǫ n and {|X| < ǫ}(1 − X 2 /ǫ 2 ) ≥ (1 − X 2 /ǫ 2 )).
Iteration of the last inequality yields the result. Note that it was necessary to apply disintegrability of P when applying the martingale property (that is, elementwise conglomerability is used).
